The Resistance to Theory
Paul de Man
Study materials for research scholars of Indian Universities.
Dr. S. Sreekumar
Paul de Man
(December 6, 1919 – December 21, 1983) was one of the most prominent literary
critics in the United States who succeeded in bringing German and French
philosophical approaches into Anglo-American literary studies and critical
theory. De Man’s companionship with Jacques Derrida
proved very influential as both took up the epistemological difficulties
inherent in any textual, literary, or critical activity. This approach aroused
considerable opposition, which de Man attributed to "resistance"
inherent in the difficult enterprise of literary interpretation itself.
De Man’s
career as the faculty in French and Comparative Literature at Yale University
proved very decisive in the history of Deconstruction. Derrida was a frequent
visitor to the University at that time and together they piloted the destiny of
what is today known as the Yale School of Deconstruction. At the time of his
death from cancer, de Man was Sterling Professor of the Humanities and chairman
of the Department of Comparative Literature at Yale. His influence is seen in
the writings of Gayatri Spivak, Barbara Johnson and Hellis Miller.
De Man’s Contribution to literary
theory
In his
1967 essay "Criticism and Crisis," Man argued that literary works are
fictions rather than factual accounts. Thus they exemplify the break between a
sign and its meaning: literature "means"
nothing, but critics resist this insight.
De Man
argued that what critics call anthropology, linguistics, psychoanalysis, is
nothing but “literature
reappearing like the hydra's head in the very spot where it had been
suppressed. The human mind will go through amazing feats to avoid facing 'the
nothingness of human matters'."
De Man
believed that due to the resistance to acknowledging that literature does not
"mean", English departments had become
"large organizations in the service of everything except their own subject
matter". He said that the study of literature had become the art of applying psychology,
politics, history, philology or other disciplines to the literary text, in an
effort to make the text "mean" something.
Blindness and Insight
This is
a collection of De Man's earlier essays from the 1960s. Here he tries “to tease out the tension
between rhetoric and meaning”, looking for moments in the text where linguistic
forces "tie themselves into a knot which arrests the process of
understanding." [By ‘rhetoric’ de Man means figural language and trope]
The collection
represents an attempt to seek the paradoxes in the texts of New Criticism and
move beyond formalism.
One of
De Man's central topic is of the blindness on which these critical readings are
predicated, that the "insight seems instead to have been gained from a
negative movement that animates the critic's thought, an unstated principle
that leads his language away from its asserted stand. . . as if the very
possibility of assertion had been put into question.
De Man questions
the notion of the poetic work as a “unified, atemporal icon, a self-possessed
repository of meaning” free from intentional and affective fallacies. In his
argument, formalist and New Critical emphasis on the "organic" nature
of poetry is ultimately self-defeating because the
notion of the verbal icon is undermined by the irony and ambiguity inherent
within it. Form ultimately acts as "both a creator and destroyer of
organic totalities," and "the final
insight...annihilated the premises which led up to it."
Allegories of Reading
Here de
Man explores the tensions arising in figural language in Nietzsche, Rousseau,
Rilke, and Proust. He concentrates on crucial passages which have “a meta-linguistic
function or meta-critical implications, particularly those where figural
language has a dependency on classical philosophical oppositions”.
[essence/accident, synchronic/diachronic]. These oppositions are central to
Western discourse.
For de
Man, an "Allegory of Reading" emerges when texts are subjected to
scrutiny and reveal this tension; a reading wherein “the text reveals its own
assumptions about language, and in so doing dictates a statement about
undecidability, the difficulties inherent in totalization, their own
readability, or the "limitations of textual authority."
The Resistance to Theory—An Overview
Attempts
to pin down truth in language is an impossible task. The double bind [ see notes 1 ] which is considered as a license by
other deconstructionists to pursue meaning as far as their hermeneutic
ingenuity [ see notes 2 ] can carry them is
accepted by de Man in a spirit of stoical irony [ see
notes 3]. ‘The Resistance to Theory’ explains de Man’s position clearly.
De Man
views language as unreliable. [This is a position taken by all
deconstructionists]. Language is unreliable because of the rhetorical and
figural component in it. [See notes 4]. Rhetoric
continuously undermines the abstract systems of grammar and logic. [See notes 5]. Literature frankly admits the
rhetoricity in it. Thus it avoids the bad faith of other discourses—history and
Sciences—that try to repress or deny it. The discourse of traditional literary
criticism and literary history also try to repress or deny rhetoricity in
language. Since literature/ or literary theory are not reliable sources of
information, traditional attempts to connect the world and the book is a
waste of time. Hence traditional scholars resist literary theory. Their
resistance is also because of their anxiety as they consider literature as a
representation of reality.
De Man’s
argument does not end here. He says that resistance to theory is a displacement
of a much deeper resistance, or contradiction in theory itself. In short, the
resistance to theory is in-built in the theoretical discourse itself.
With
characteristically wry humor, de Man comments that if anybody thinks that
literary theory can be done away with because it is also unreliable it is like
‘rejecting anatomy because it has failed to cure human mortality’.
Critical Summary of the essay
"The
Resistance to Theory" first appeared in Yale French Studies 63 (1982) and was widely anthologized. The
essay later became part of the book by the same name. It is a key statement in
poststructuralist approaches to literary studies. The essay argues that "the main theoretical
interest of literary theory consists in the impossibility of its
definition."
De Man
says that literary theory originates when the approach to literary texts is not on the basis of non-linguistic factors like history
and aesthetics. The introduction of linguistic and semiotic terminology
into literary studies gives the language, "considerable
freedom from referential restraint". This introduction also makes
literary studies ‘epistemologically highly suspect and volatile’ [epistemology=
the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity and
scope]. De Man means that literary study, as a branch of knowledge, is
undependable.
De Man
brings in the ideas of Saussure and Nietzsche and points out that ‘the rhetorical and tropological
dimension of language makes it an unreliable medium for communication of
truths’. Literary language is predominantly rhetorical and figurative.
Therefore it is not a reliable source of
information about anything.
Crisis in Literary Studies
Literary
language is unreliable. This gives rise to a crisis in literary studies because
"literariness" is no longer an aesthetic quality or a mimetic mode.
De Man’s
argument about aesthetic quality is interesting. He says that aesthetic effect
arises in a work when ‘we mistake the materiality of the signifier with the
materiality of the signified by considering language as an intuitive and
transparent medium’. [Any
signifier is material, in the sense that it can be seen and understood as a
signifier. The signified is only a concept or many concepts. When someone writes
‘Africa’, for example, we can see the signifier ‘Africa’ but we can not see the
signified (actual Africa). The actual remains only a concept]. But in actuality language is a material
and conventional medium.
Mimesis,
like aesthetic quality, is also an effect of the rhetorical and figurative
aspects of language. [Refer notes 4]. Language is not a transparent and
intuitive guide from the textual material to the historical situation.
Therefore if we assume that ideological and historical contexts exist as
backgrounds for literary texts [as New Historicism claims] our assumption will
become problematic. As a
result of the ‘disconnect’ between reality and the linguistic representation of
the same, the theorists who uphold an aesthetic approach or a historical
approach to literary studies find theory inconvenient and challenging. They are
the polemical opponents of theory.
De Man’s conclusion
Literary
theory is only a linguistic construct like literature. It is unreliable like
literary language. De Man states that the resistance to theory may be "a built-in constituent of
its discourse." [Resistance is in the discourse about theory
itself]. Therefore the real debate of literary theory is not with its opponents
‘but rather with its own methodological assumptions and possibilities.’ This is
because "the
resistance to theory is a resistance to the use of language about
language." The resistance to theory is therefore, according to de Man, a
resistance to reading: "Nothing can overcome the resistance to theory
since theory 'is' itself this resistance."
De Man
concludes however by stating that "literary theory is not in danger of
going under; it cannot help but flourish, and the more it is resisted, the more
it flourishes, since the language it speaks is the language of self
resistance."
Detailed
Summary
The strong interest in literary theory in the United States
coincided with the ‘importation and reception’ of continental influences. But in the 70s and 80s the interest in
theory is receding. The reason for this may be satiation or disappointment
after the initial enthusiasm. The ebb
and flow of interest and aversion is natural but it makes the depth of
resistance to literary theory clear.
However, the predominant trend in North American literary criticism
before the nineteen sixties was not against literary theory. Even the theoretically uninterested writers
made use of a minimal set of concepts like ‘tone’, ‘organic form’ ‘allusion’,
‘tradition’, ‘historical situation’, etc. The interest in theory was asserted
publicly and practised. The influential text books of the era were Understanding Poetry (Brooks and
Warren), Theory of Literature (Wellek
and Warren), The Mirror and the Lamp
(M.H.Abrams), and The Verbal Icon
(Wimsatt and Beardsley).
None of
the above writers can be called theoreticians in ‘the post-1960 sense of the
term’. Their work did not provoke as strong reactions as that of later
theoreticians. Their critical approaches experienced no difficulty fitting into
the academic establishments. Many of them pursued successful parallel careers
as poets or novelists next to their academic functions. ‘The perfect embodiment
of the New Criticism remains, in many respects, the personality and the
ideology of T.S.Eliot, a combination of original talent, traditional learning,
verbal wit and moral earnestness...’. Their main concern was cultural and
ideological rather than theoretical. They were oriented towards ‘the integrity
of a social and historical self’ rather than towards ‘the impersonal
consistency that theory requires’. Culture allows cosmopolitanism and it was
the spirit of the American Academy of the fifties. It had no difficulty
appreciating and assimilating outstanding products of a kindred spirit that
originated in Europe—--Curtius, Auerbach, Croce, Spitzer, Alonso, Valery etc.
De Man says that ‘the consensus that brings these extremely diverse trends and
individuals together is their shared resistance to theory’.
Literary
theory originates when the approach to literary texts is not based on
non-linguistic factors like historical or aesthetic considerations. In other words the consideration should not be on meaning or
value but on modalities of production and reception of meaning. The
question of the relationship between aesthetics and meaning is more problematic
because aesthetics is connected to the effect of meaning rather than with the
content as such. Aesthetics is part of a universal system of philosophy. It
cannot be termed a theory. De Man says that it is difficult to see the modern
developments in literary theory as a product of philosophical speculations. He
believes that contemporary literary theory is autonomous. It came from outside
philosophy and this adds a subversive element of unpredictability to literary
theory. ‘...it is something of a wild card in the serious game of the
theoretical disciplines’.
Background of theory
The
advent of theory (which made it different from literary history and literary
criticism) occurred with the introduction of linguistic terminology in the
metalanguage about literature. ‘Contemporary literary theory comes into its own
in such events as the application of Saussurian linguistics to literary texts’.
The link
between structural linguistics and literary texts was not obvious in the
beginning. Peirce, Saussure, Sapir and Bloomfield were not concerned with
literature at all but with the scientific foundations of linguistics. But
philologists like Roman Jakobson and literary critics like Roland Barthes took
interest in semiology. This highlighted the natural attraction of literature to
a theory of linguistic signs. When language was considered as a system of signs
and signification, the traditional barrier between literary and non-literary
uses of language disappeared.
The
meeting of literature with semiology was more intense than the meetings of
literature with philology, psychology or epistemology. The meeting of
literature and semiology could only be described in terms of their own,
specifically linguistic terms only, whereas the meetings of literature with
other disciplines could be paraphrased or translated in terms of common
knowledge. The
linguistics of semiology and literature has something in common that is related
only to them. This something is often referred to as literariness and it has
become the object of literary theory.
Literariness
Literariness is often misunderstood
for aesthetic response. The use of such terms as style and stylistics (which
carry aesthetic connotations) along with literariness adds to the confusion.
Again the search (for example, by Roland Barthes) for coincidence between the phonic
properties of a word and its signifying function helps to foster the confusion.
[ We create such confusion when
we speak about the onomatopoeic properties of certain words in the language
forgetting the fact that the same effect may not be visible in other languages] Barthes speaks about the Cratylism (see notes 6) in Proust. ‘Proust saw the relationship
between signifier and signified as motivated,
the one copying the other and representing in its material form the signified
essence of the thing’. [Scholars
must remember that Saussure saw the relationship between signifier and
signified as arbitrary]
Here de Man comments:
But one may ask whether it is not more
or less consciously present in all writing and whether it is possible to be a
writer without some sort of belief in the natural relationship between names
and essences. The
poetic function..would thus be defined by a Cratylian awareness of the sign,
and the writer would be the conveyor of this myth which wants language to
imitate the idea and which, contrary to the teachings
of linguistic science, thinks of signs as motivated signs.
The convergence of sound and meaning
celebrated by Barthes in Proust was later dismissed by Proust himself as ‘a
seductive temptation to mystified minds’. This can be considered a mere effect
which language can perfectly well achieve. But it has no substantial
relationship to anything beyond that effect. De Man says that this effect is
rhetorical rather than aesthetic. It is an identifiable trope (paranomasis) (see notes 7) that operates on the level of the signifier and contains no responsible
pronouncement on the nature of the world (though it creates such an illusion).
The relationship between
word and thing is not phenomenal but conventional.
‘This
gives the language considerable freedom from referential restraint’. But at the
same time ‘the use of language can no longer be decided by considerations of
truth and falsehood, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, or pleasure and pain’.
When this autonomous potential of language is revealed, we deal with
literariness. This literariness makes us aware of the unreliability of
linguistic utterance. The foregrounding of materials and the phenomenal aspects
of language create a strong illusion of aesthetic seduction. ‘Literature
involves the voiding, rather than the affirmation of aesthetic categories’.
De Man
suggests a potentially revolutionary idea when he states:
...whereas
we have traditionally been accustomed to reading literature by analogy with the
plastic arts and with music, we now have to recognize the necessity of a
non-perceptual, linguistic moment in painting and in music, and learn to read
pictures rather than to imagine meaning.
[How to
appreciate a picture without considering its meaning is left to our surmise.
Did de Man seriously think that such a thing is possible?].
Literariness is also not a mimetic quality
Literariness
is also not a mimetic quality. Mimesis is another trope among many others. It
is language choosing to imitate a non-verbal entity (like nature) ‘just as
paranomasis imitates a sound’. Literariness is misrepresented as pure verbalism
and this is also one of the main objections against literary theory. When we
allow a non-phenomenal linguistics (where the signifier has no value outside
itself), we liberate the discourse on literature from ‘naïve opposition between
fiction and reality. In genuine semiology, the referential function of language
is not denied. Far from it, what is questioned is the authority of language as
a model for natural cognition (understanding).
Literature
is fiction not because it somehow refuses to acknowledge ‘reality’, but because
it is not ‘a priori’ certain that language functions according to principle
which are those, or which are like those, of the phenomenal world.
Thus it
is NOT certain that literature is a reliable
source of information about anything but its own language.
It is
unfortunate to confuse the materiality of the signifier with the materiality of
what it signifies. This is clear in the case of light and sound. [‘No one in
his right mind will try to grow grapes by the luminosity of the word ‘day’’].
But it is not so with regard to the phenomenality of space, time and self. It
is very difficult to conceive the pattern of one’s past and future life in
accordance with fictional narratives. Ideology is
precisely the confusion of linguistics with natural reality. Thus the
linguistics of literariness is a powerful and indispensable tool in the
unmasking of ideological aberrations. There are people who discredit literary
theory by stating that it is oblivious of social and historical reality. These
people are merely stating their fear at having their own ideological
mystifications exposed by the tool they are trying to discredit.
Why does literary theory provoke strong resistance and attacks?
·
It
upsets rooted ideologies by exposing the mechanics of their workings.
·
It goes
against the powerful philosophical tradition of which aesthetics is a prominent
part.
·
It
upsets the established canon of literary works and blurs the borderline between
literary and non-literary discourse.
De Man
says that the reasons mentioned above are ‘ample enough’. But these are not
satisfying answers.
De Man
argues that the development of literary theory is itself ‘overdetermined by
complications inherent in its very project and unsettling with regard to its
status as a scientific discipline’.
Resistance
may be a built-in constituent of its discourse, in a manner that would be
inconceivable in the natural sciences and unmentionable in the social sciences.
Displaced symptoms of Resistance
De Man
says that ‘the polemical opposition, the systematic
non-understanding and misrepresentation, the unsubstantial but eternally
recurrent objections are all displaced symptoms of resistance’ inherent
in literary theory itself. But this is not an excuse for rejecting literary
theory. It would be like ‘rejecting anatomy because it has failed to cure
mortality’. ‘The real
debate of literary theory is not with its polemical opponents but rather with
its own methodological assumptions and possibilities’. Instead of asking why
literary theory is threatening, we should ask why literary theory has such
difficulty doing its business and why very often it lapses into the language of
self-justification and self-defence.
De Man
adds that such difficulties, as mentioned above, always existed for literary
theory. One of the main achievements of the present literary trend is that it
created some awareness of this fact.
The Resistance to Theory
‘The resistance to theory is a resistance to the use of
language about language. It is a resistance to language itself or to the
possibility that language contains factors or functions that cannot be reduced
to intuition.’ But we think that when we refer to the word ‘language’,
we know what we are talking about. De Man says that ‘there is probably no word
to be found in the language that is as overdetermined, self-evasive, disfigured
and disfiguring as ‘language’’. The classical ‘trivium’, the most familiar and
general of all linguistic models, considers the science of language as
consisting of grammar, rhetoric and logic. De Man says that it is ‘in fact a set of unresolved tensions powerful enough to have
generated an infinitely prolonged discourse of endless frustration of which
contemporary literary theory ...is one more chapter’.
The
difficulties in the case of language exist within the ‘trivium’ in the internal
relationship between the constituents (grammar, logic, rhetoric) and with the
‘quadrivium’ [which gives us knowledge of the world in general and which covers
non-verbal sciences of number (arithmetic), of space (geometry), of motion
(astronomy) and of time (music)].
Logic as a link between ‘trivium’ and ‘quadrivium’.
In
philosophy the link between ‘trivium’ and ‘quadrivium’ is kept by logic. In
logic the rigor of linguistic discourse matches up with the rigor of
mathematical discourse. In the seventeenth century the relationship between
philosophy and Mathematics was very close. This century considered geometry
[which is a homogenous concatenation (a series or order of things depending on
each other, as if linked together)] between space, time and number, as ‘the
sole model of coherence and economy’. All other models created a degree of confusion
which only geometrical minds can understand. This is a clear example of a
connection between a science of the phenomenal world (Mathematics) and a
science of language. Here language is a tool for a correct
‘axiomatic-deductive, synthetic reasoning’.
This
articulation of the science of language with the mathematical sciences
represent a continuity between a theory of language as logic and the knowledge
of the phenomenal world to which Mathematics belongs. In such a system the
aesthetics has a place. However, De Man
argues that the link between logic and natural science
is not secure. Historical evidence points towards that. Moreover within
the confines of the ‘trivium’ itself, the relationship between grammar,
rhetoric and logic is unstable / problematic.
Literariness, which is the use of language that
foregrounds the rhetorical over the grammatical and the logical function, is an
unsettling element which disrupts the inner balance of the model.
Consequently it affects the extension of the model into the non-verbal world as
well.
Logic
and grammar have a natural affinity to each other. A. J. Greimas, the
distinguished French semiotician and narratologist, asserted that the
grammatical and the logical functions of language are co-extensive. There is a
persistent symbiosis betenn grammar and logic. De man says that ‘grammar is an
isotope of logic’. [Isotope= any two or more forms of an element where the atoms
have the same number of protons but a different number of neutrons within their
nuclei]
Uncertain relationship between grammar and rhetoric
Any
theory of language, as long as it remains grounded in grammar, does not
threaten the underlying principles of all ‘cognitive and aesthetic linguistic
systems’.
The Study of grammar is the necessary pre-condition
for scientific and humanistic knowledge. As long as it leaves this
principle intact, there is nothing
threatening about literary theory.
Difficulties
originate when it becomes impossible to ignore the rhetorical dimension of the
discourse. Then it becomes no longer possible to keep rhetoric as a mere
adjunct, a mere ornament within the semantic function.
We see
the uncertain relationship between grammar and rhetoric in the history of the
‘trivium’, in the uncertain status of figures of speech or tropes. Tropes used
to be part of the study of grammar. They
were also considered to be the semantic agent of rhetoric. They are
text-producing functions that are not patterned on non-verbal entity. But Grammar is capable of extra-linguistic
generalization. The tension between grammar and rhetoric arises in the problem of reading, the process that
necessarily partakes of both. Thus ‘the resistance to theory is the resistance to reading’.
This resistance is more apparent in what are called theories of reading. These
theories avoid the function for which they are generated.
The
study of literary texts is necessarily dependent on an act of reading. One has
to read a text or at least part of it to make a statement about it. To stress
the need of reading implies two things:
Literature is not a transparent
message. The distinction between the message and the medium of communicating it
is not clearly established.
The grammatical decoding of a text
leaves a residue (remains) of indetermination that cannot be solved by
grammatical means.
Contemporary
semiology extends grammar to include figural dimensions. This has considerably
expanded the knowledge of textual codes. This extension is always directed towards the replacement of
rhetorical figures by grammatical codes. The tendency to replace
rhetorical figures by grammatical terminology is admirable as it tends towards the
mastering and the clarification of meaning.
The replacement of a hermeneutic by a
semiotic model, of interpretation by decoding, would represent, in view of the
baffling historical instability of textual meanings (including those of
canonical texts) a considerable progress. Much of the hesitation associate4d
with ‘reading’ could thus be dispelled.
No
grammatical decoding could unravel the total figural dimensions of a text. There are grammatical elements in all texts
whose semantic function is not grammatically definable. De Man takes The Fall of Hyperion as an example for this:
De Man’s Analysis of the title of the
poem The Fall of Hyperion
How will
we interpret the genitive
in the title of The Fall of Hyperion? [The
poem is an unfinished epic by John Keats. (See notes 8)]
What is
the meaning of the title? Is it ‘Hyperion’s fall’ (the case story of the defeat of an older
power by a newer one)? or ‘Hyperion
falling’? [‘Hyperion
falling’ is less clear but more disquieting (unsettling/
troubling/distressing) evocation of the actual process of falling. (There is no
mention of the beginning of the fall or its end or the identity of the entity
(God or Man or thing) to whom it befalls (happens/appears) to be falling.
Keats
wrote two poems, ‘Hyperion’ and The Fall
of Hyperion. He could not complete both poems.
Now De Man
takes up the story of the poem.
The
story told in the second poem is about a character who resembles Apollo rather than Hyperion.
The same Apollo should be triumphantly standing rather than falling if Keats
‘had not been compelled to interrupt (without any apparent reason) the story of
Apollo’s triumph. [De
Man refers to the abandoning of the first version by Keats]
Does the title tell us that Hyperion is
fallen and that Apollo stands, or does it tell us that Hyperion and Apollo [and
Keats, whom it is hard to distinguish (according
to De Man)
from Apollo] are interchangeable in that all of them are necessarily and
constantly falling?
Both
readings are grammatically correct, but it is impossible to decide from the
context which version is the right one.
De Man suggests: ...Keats was
unable to complete either version because of the difficulty in understanding the correct meaning of
the title he himself has given to the poem.
Then De Man puts forward an interesting
proposition. We can read the word ‘Hyperion’ in the title figurally or
intertextually. In this reading, Hyperion is not the historical or mythological
character. Here Hyperion refers to the title the poet has given to the first
text. In that case, the second text refers to the fall (failure) of the first
text. Does it mean that the fall of ‘Hyperion’ is the triumph of The Fall of Hyperion? [the failure of the first text as the success of the second]
De Man says that this is not quite true
as the poet fails to complete the second text as well.
Here De
Man borrows a favorite theme of deconstructionists: ‘Or are we telling the story of why all texts, as
texts, can always be said to be falling’.
This
also is not exactly true as the story of the fall of the first text applies
only to the first. It is, of course, narrated in the second but it could not be
read as the meaning of the second.
The
undecidability involves the figural or literal status of the proper name
Hyperion as well as the verb falling. It is a matter of figuration and not of
grammar.
In
‘Hyperion’s Fall’ the word fall is figural. We read this standing up. But in
‘Hyperion Falling’, this is not the case, for ‘if Hyperion can be Apollo and
Apollo can be Keats, then he can also be us and his figural or symbolic fall
becomes his and our literal falling as well’.
The
difference between the two readings is itself structured as a trope. [a figure of speech in which words
or phrases are used with a non-literal or figurative meaning, such as a
metaphor].
How we
read the title is very important. ‘It is an exercise not only in semantics, but
in what the text actually does to us’. Faced with the necessity to come to a
decision, no grammatical or logical analysis can help us out. Just as Keats had
to break off his narrative, the reader has to break off his understanding. This
break off occurs at the very moment when the reader is most directly engaged by
the text.
At this
moment there is a ‘fearful symmetry’ (the
phrase is from William Blake)
between the author’s and reader’s plight. The symmetry is a trap and the
question of the ‘meaning’ is not ‘merely’ theoretical.
The
undoing of theory results in ‘the disturbance of the stable cognitive field
that extends from grammar to logic to a general science of man and of the
phenomenal world’. This can be developed into ‘a theoretical project of
rhetorical analysis that will reveal the inadequacy of grammatical methods of
non-reading’. Rhetoric has a negative relationship to grammar and to logic. This undoes the claims of the ‘trivium’ to be a stable
construct.
The resistance to theory is a resistance to the rhetorical or
tropological dimension of language.
This dimension is more explicitly foregrounded in literature than in any other
verbal manifestations. Grammar and figuration are integral parts of reading.
Therefore reading appears to be a negative process in which the grammatical cognition
is undone by rhetorical displacement. ‘The model of the ‘trivium’ contains
within itself the pseudo-dialectic of its own undoing and its history tells the
story of this dialectic’.
Contemporary theoretical scene
The
scene is dominated by an increased stress on reading as a theoretical problem
or an increased stress on the reception rather than the production of a text.
In the United States the emphasis is on reading. This was the direction of the
New Critical tradition of the forties and fifties. De Man says that the
‘contemporary interest in a poetics of literature is clearly linked, rationally
enough to the problems of reading’. The
concentration on reading may lead to the rediscovery of the theoretical
difficulties associated with rhetoric.
De Man
believes that ‘the most instructive aspect of contemporary theory is the
refinement of the techniques by which the threat inherent in rhetorical
analysis’ is avoided. This avoidance is at the ‘very moment’ when, because of
the effectiveness of these techniques, the rhetorical obstacles to
understanding can no longer be ‘mistranslated into thematic and phenomenal
commonplaces’. The contemporary theoretical scene is dominated by theoreticians
of reading. According to De Man the resistance to
reading appears in its most rigorous form among the theoreticians of reading.
Theoreticians
of reading like Greimas, H.R.Jauss or Wolfgang Iser are committed to the use of
grammatical models or ‘to traditional hermeneutic models’ that do not allow for
the problematization of reading and ‘remain uncritically confined within a
theory of literature rooted in aesthetics’. This argument is easy to make
because once a reader becomes aware of the ‘rhetorical dimensions’ of a text,
he will find examples from the text that are not restricted by grammar or
historically determined meaning. De Man feels that there is a shared reluctance
among the readers to follow the obvious ‘rhetorical dimensions’. This remains a
puzzle. There is an argument that the textual analysis will be lengthy. De man
suggests that the analysis will not be as brief as in the case of the title of The Fall of Hyperion. But to carry the
analysis into the critical reception and reading of Keats’ entire text would
require much space to be completed.
Speech Act Theory of Reading and the Problems involved
The
theoreticians of Speech Act avoid rhetoric. They show a strong interest in
certain elements of language which exclude/postpone the consideration of
tropes, ideologies etc. They try to establish a link between performance,
grammar, logic, and stable referential meaning. The resultant theories are ‘not
different from the theories of grammarians and semioticians’ [who aspire for
stable referential meaning]. However astute practitioners of speech act theory
rightly insist on the necessity to keep the actual performance of speech acts,
which is conventional rather than cognitive, separate from its causes and
effects. They, in short, keep the ‘illocutionary force separate from its
perlocutionary function’ [see notes 9 ].
Rhetoric
[which is persuasion] is banished from the preformative moment to the affective
area of perlocution [by speech act theoreticians]. Persuasion is inseparable
from rhetoric. But it is relegated to the purely affective area. De Man says
that rhetoric is persuasion and is a part of literary texts. It is persuasion
by proof. When it is thus removed to the affective area it creates suspicion.
To take
away the epistemological features [knowledge based] of rhetoric is to take away the tropological and figural
functions of rhetoric. It is like removing rhetoric from the trivium and
considering it as a mere correlative of illocution. De Man warns us that if
rhetoric is equated with psychology rather than with epistemology, it will open
up prospects of banality [triviality, dullness]. Speech act theories stand for
the grammatization of the trivium at the expense of rhetoric. Considering the
performative aspects as mere convention makes it in effect a grammatical code
[which is nothing but conventional] like other codes. De Man concludes his argument
thus: ‘Speech act oriented theories of reading read only to the extent that
they prepare the way for the rhetorical reading they avoid’.
Concluding remarks
In
conclusion, De Man argues that a ‘true’ rhetorical reading [where there is no
phenomenalization or undue grammatical or performative codification of the
text] is possible. Aims and methods of literary theory would strive for that.
Such a rhetorical reading will undo the grammatical construct and
systematically disarticulate the trivium. But it will be theoretically sound
and effective.
Technically
correct rhetorical reading may be boring, predictable and unpleasant. But it is
irrefutable [ unquestionable / convincing].
They are
also totalizing and ‘potentially totalitarian’. The structures and functions
they expose ‘do not lead to the knowledge of an entity but are an unreliable
process of knowledge production that prevents all entities including linguistic
entities from coming into discourse. De Man calls them ‘consistently defective
models of language’s impossibility to be a model language’.
They are
theory and not theory at the same time, the universal theory of the
impossibility of theory. ...rhetorical readings...still avoid and resist the
reading they advocate. Nothing can overcome the resistance to theory since
theory is itself this resistance.
De Man
concludes that literary theory is not in danger of disappearing. ‘It cannot help but flourish,
and the more it is resisted, the more it flourishes, since the language it
speaks is the language of self-resistance’. With laconic humour De Man
concludes: ‘What remains impossible to decide is whether this flourishing is a
triumph or a fall’.
NOTES
1. Double bind—A Zen story is a good illustration for
double bind. A Zen master says to his pupils: “If you say this stick is real, I
will beat you. If you say this stick is not real, I will beat you. If you say
nothing, I will beat you”. There seems to be no way out.
The
double bind is something that happens in the use of language. Derrida argues that our understanding of
words depends on other words. These words themselves depend on other words for
their significance. Thus it is an endless chain of signifiers, pointing to
nothing beyond themselves. In short, language depends on nothing, no
fundamental logic, science or society. What an author ‘meant’ has no existence
outside words. When an author selects one word and leaves out another, he
selects one meaning and suppresses other meanings. The final meaning is the
result of repeated suppression of other meanings. All these meanings will come
out in interpretation. Thus there is no end to interpretation and no escaping
it. This is called ‘double bind’ by Derrida.
Notes 2— Hermeneutic ingenuity
Hermeneutic
ingenuity arises when interpretations are carried forward in an ingenious
(clever, resourceful, inventive) manner. An example for hermeneutic ingenuity
is provided here from Derrida’s writings.
In Margins of Philosophy Derrida speaks
about ‘differance’. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp 3-27.]
Here
Derrida speaks about the letter ‘A’ in ‘differAnce’. He first plays on the
"silence" of the ‘A’ in différAnce [it is scarcely heard in French
pronunciation] as being like a silent tomb, like a pyramid, like the pyramid
(A) to which Hegel compares the body of the sign. [when we write ‘A’, the letter appears like a pyramid]
A
pyramid is a tomb. In Greek language "Tomb" is ‘oikesis’. ‘Oikesis’
is close to the Greek ‘oikos’ (house).
From the
word ‘oikos’ the word "economy" is derived (‘oikos’ ‘house’ and
‘nemein’--to manage).
Thus
Derrida speaks of the "economy of death" as the "familial
residence and tomb of the proper."
Further,
and more elliptically still, Derrida speaks of the tomb, which always bears an
inscription in stone, announcing the death of the tyrant. (This seems to refer
to Hegel's treatment of the Antigone story in the Phenomenology. It will be
recalled that Antigone defies the tyrant Creon by burying her brother
Polynices. Creon retaliates by having Antigone entombed. There she cheats the
slow death that awaits her by hanging herself. The tyrant Creon has a change of
heart too late, and (after the suicides of his son and wife, his family) kills
himself). Thus family, death, inscription, tomb, law, economy.
From the
above example, I think that the scholars have understood the difficulties in
following the thought process of Derrida. The pages (3-27) offer us a
dazzlingly wayward discourse. Hermeneutic ingenuity cannot go further.
3. Stoical irony
Stoicism
is the school of philosophy founded by Zeno, who taught that people should be
free from passion, unmoved by joy or grief, and submit without complaint to unavoidable
necessity [accepting everything in life shrugging one’s shoulders].
4. Rhetorical and Figural Component in
language.
Figurative
language is any figure of speech which depends on a non-literal meaning of some
or all of the words used. There are many types of figurative language,
including literary devices such as simile, metaphor, personification, and many
pun examples, to name just a few. The definition of figurative language is
opposite to that of literal language, which involves only the “proper” or
dictionary definitions of words. Figurative language usually requires the
reader or listener to understand some extra nuances, context, allusions, etc.
in order to understand the second meaning. However, figurative language is such
a common part of regular speech that adult native speakers of a language can
just as easily interpret figurative language as literal language.
We’ll
cross that bridge when we come to it.
The ball
is in your court.
Every
cloud has a silver lining.
5. From the above examples it is clear
that Rhetoric
continuously undermines the abstract systems of grammar and logic. ‘We will
cross the bridge’ is not at all about anyone crossing any bridge. The
grammatical and logical meaning have no relevance here. What is important to
the reader is the rhetorical meaning.
6. "Cratylian awareness of the
sign"
A figure
evoked by de Mann, Cratylus is a Platonic character, an essentialist who
subscribes to an ideological vision. He positioned the necessary and absolutely
perfect correspondence between words and things, i.e., between the signifier
and the signified. This is against Sausserian linguistics which states that the
relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary
7.
Paranomasis
Paronomasia
is a rhetorical term for punning or playing with words. The term paronomasia is
sometimes used more loosely to describe a combination of words that are similar
in sound.
Examples:-
Horse
Lovers are Stable People.
I
used to be a tap dancer until I fell in the sink.
Contraceptives
should be used on every conceivable occasion.
8. The Fall of Hyperion
The
Fall of Hyperion: A Dream is an
epic poem written by John Keats. The poem exists in two versions. The first, Hyperion, was begun in 1818 and
published, unfinished, in 1820. The second, The
Fall of Hyperion, was composed by reworking, expanding, and personally
narrating lines from the first poem. It was also left unfinished and was
posthumously published in 1856.
The plot
and structure of the poem has been greatly influenced by three previous epics,
Virgil's Aeneid, Milton's Paradise Lost, and Dante's Divine Comedy.
9. A locutionary act, the performance of an
utterance: the actual utterance and its ostensible meaning, comprising
phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts corresponding to the verbal, syntactic and
semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance. An illocutionary act: the pragmatic 'illocutionary
force' of the utterance, thus its intended significance as a socially valid
verbal action. And in certain cases a further perlocutionary act: its actual effect, such as
persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise getting
someone to do or realize something, whether intended or not.
Study materials for research scholars of Indian Universities.
Dr. S. Sreekumar
So precise yet so interesting.. Thank you Sir
ReplyDeleteNic,Thankyou.
ReplyDeleteAll your hard work is much appreciated. Nobody can stop to admire you. Lots of appreciation. monica y el sexo
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